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Instrumental Variables Before and LATEr
Toru Kitagawa
Abstract. The modern formulation of the instrumental variable methods ini-
tiated the valuable interactions between economics and statistics literatures of
causal inference and fueled new innovations of the idea. It helped resolving
the long-standing confusion that the statisticians used to have on the method,
and encouraged the economists to rethink how to make use of instrumental
variables in policy analysis.
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It is an honor to comment on Professor Imbens’ pa-
per on instrumental variables methods. The discussed
paper reviews both the origin of the instrumental vari-
ables methods in econometrics and their modern for-
mulation and interpretation based on the concept of
potential outcomes originating in statistics. A unique
feature of this review article is its comparative perspec-
tive. Imbens convinces us that “choice versus chance in
treatment assignment” best summarizes the difference
between econometrics and statistics in their traditions
of identifying causal effects.
The seminal papers by Angrist, Imbens and Rubin
(Imbens and Angrist, 1994; Angrist, Imbens and Ru-
bin, 1996) on the potential outcome-based formulation
of the instrumental variables method are some of the
few rare works that generated equally enormous influ-
ence on both econometrics and statistics communities.
In the economics side, the major impacts appear in the
following three aspects. First, the modern way of view-
ing an instrumental variable in relation to treatment
noncompliance and an encouragement design widened
the scope of applications of the method. Traditionally,
the uses of the instrumental variables method were re-
stricted to observational studies, and economic theories
or researcher’s background knowledge on the prob-
lem were playing a unique role in validating the ex-
ogeneity and exclusion restrictions of the employed in-
strument. Nowadays, this new encouragement design
viewpoint offers another strategy for finding an instru-
ment in a given application, and with a randomized
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initial treatment assignment, researchers can validate
easily and credibly the instrument exogeneity assump-
tion without resorting to an economic theory. Second,
the concept of the local average treatment effect con-
siderably changed the way we interpret the estimation
results. We are no longer puzzled by obtaining contra-
dicting estimation results across different instruments,
and we treat them as separate and valuable pieces of
information about heterogeneous causal effects. In ad-
dition, acknowledging nonidentfiability of the popula-
tion average causal effect has promoted the discussion
of whether the instrumental variable method should be
used for the actual policy decision making and how.
Third, the discovery of the importance of instrument
monotonicity assumption led us to think more carefully
about the subjects’ causal/behavioral responses to the
assigned instrument.
In what follows, I first illustrate by an example the
link between the textbook linear instrumental variable
model and the potential outcome framework to com-
plement the discussion that Imbens gave in Section 6.
In the second part, I review the active but unsettled dis-
cussions about usefulness of estimating the local aver-
age treatment effect, and provide briefly my personal
opinion on the issue.
1. CAUSAL INTERPRETATION IN THE TEXTBOOK
MODEL
The standard econometrics education introduces the
instrumental variables methods in the form of, what
Imbens called, the standard textbook set up,
Y obsi = β0 + β1Xobsi + β ′2Vi + εi,(1.1)
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where Y obsi is an outcome observation of unit i, Xobsi
is a treatment variable of which the causal effect on the
outcome is of interest, Vi is a vector of observable co-
variates (often called control covariates), and εi is an
unobservable term often called as an unobserved het-
erogeneity of unit i. A common way to motivate the
use of instrumental variables is by invalidating the least
square method due to “the correlation between Xobsi
and εi .” This quick but somewhat less rigorous way
of motivating the instrumental variables methods of-
ten creates confusions. If equation (1.1) were specify-
ing a regression equation or a linear projection, then
the projection residual εi is by construction uncorre-
lated with Xobsi , and, accordingly, the concern about
endogeneity E(Xobsi εi) = 0 would never arise. In other
words, whenever instrumental variable methods are in-
voked, it is fundamental to understand what feature or
interpretation of (1.1) distinguishes it from the statisti-
cal regression equation, and for what reason we should
suspect the dependence of Xobsi and εi .
Having a simple example would help us answer
these questions. Consider a classical problem of esti-
mation of a production function. Q denotes the quan-
tity of a homogeneous good produced and L is the
measure of labor input used (e.g., total hours worked
by the employees). We do not consider control covari-
ates for now. Assume that the production technology of
firm i is given by the following function,
Qi(L) = exp(β0 + αi)Lβ1, 0 < β1 < 1,
where β0 is an unknown constant, αi is a mean zero
unobserved productivity of firm i, and β1 is the pa-
rameter of interest assumed to be constant across firms.
The specified production function leads to a log-linear
equation,
Yi(x) = β0 + β1x + αi,(1.2)
where x = logL and Yi(x) = logQi(L). This equation
can be indeed interpreted as the causal relationship be-
tween output and input in the production process of
firm i. As in equation (3.3) of the Imbens’ article, Yi(x)
can be interpreted as i’s potential outcomes at each
possible input level x ∈ X . In econometrics terminol-
ogy, equation (1.2) is interpreted as a structural equa-
tion in the sense that it can generate any counterfactual
outcomes of unit i with respect to any manipulations
in x. Note that the structural equation (1.2) relies only
on the assumption or knowledge about the underlying
causal mechanism (production function) and, so far, no
considerations on how the data are generated have en-
tered our discussion yet.
Suppose that available data of pairs of log-output and
log-input of n producers, (Y obsi ,Xobsi ), i = 1, . . . , n,
are observational, meaning that the observed input
level Xobsi can be seen as a “choice” made by a firm i.
Following Marschak and Andrews (1944), let us model
each firm’s choice of X based on the following three
assumptions, (1) firms are rational, meaning that each
firm chooses its input to maximize own profit, (2) the
market is under perfect competition, implying that ev-
ery firm treat prices of the good and input (wage)
as given and (3) firms have complete knowledge of
their production technologies β0, β1 and αi when they
choose their input levels. Under these somewhat un-
realistic assumptions, firm i’s input choice solves the
following profit maximization problem:
Xobsi = logLobsi ,
where
Lobsi = arg max
L
{
pQi(L) − wiLi},
where p is the (common) price of the good, and wi is
the hourly wage given to firm i, which can vary over
i, that is, the wage is determined at a localized labor
market. The resulting choice Xobsi is
Xobsi =
1
1 − β1
[
β0 + log
(
pβ1
wi
)
+ αi
]
.(1.3)
If we replace x with Xobsi in (1.2) and notate Y obsi =
Yi(X
obs
i ), we obtain
Y obsi = β0 + β1Xobsi + αi.(1.4)
This equation coincides with an equation of the form
(1.1) without covariates. Equation (1.3) says that a
more productive (higher αi) firm chooses a larger
labor input, implying that the endogeneity problem
E(Xobsi αi) = 0 is present. Accordingly, (1.4) must dif-
fer from the linear projection equation of Y obsi onto
Xobsi , and the least squares regression of Y obsi onto Xobsi
fails to consistently estimate β1. Here, the keypoints
are (1) there is a specific causal model (1.2) underlying
(1.4), and (2) the subject’s optimal “choice” based on
the unobservable (to data analysts) causes correlation
E(Xobsi αi) = 0.
What can be a reasonable instrumental variable in
the current example? A search for an instrumental vari-
able can also be model-based. For instance, if wi is
available in data, equation (1.3) says that Xobsi should
be dependent on wi , while structural equation (1.2)
says wi does not directly affect the output; accordingly,
wi satisfies the instrument relevance and the instrument
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exclusion restriction. The validity of random assign-
ment E(wiαi) = 0, on the other hand, would be ques-
tionable. For instance, firms located in an urban area
can be more productive (higher αi) than those located
in a rural area, and the wage level in urban area can be
higher than the wage level in rural, possibly due to a
higher living cost and availability of more skilled la-
bor force. The motivation for using control covariates
Vi (e.g., a demeaned indicator of whether firm i is lo-
cated in an urban area or in a rural area) is to cope with
potential confounders of wi and αi . Following the way
in which Imbens treats covariates (Section 6), we as-
sume conditional random assignment wi ⊥ αi |Vi , and
specify the dependence of αi and Vi as
αi = β2Vi + εi with εi ⊥ Vi.(1.5)
Here, εi is firm i’s unobserved productivity measured
relative to conditional mean E(αi |Vi). Note that co-
efficient parameter β2 summarizes the dependence of
αi and Vi , and we are not attaching a causal inter-
pretation to β2. Plugging αi into (1.4) yields the text-
book setup of the linear instrumental variable model
(1.1), for which the two stage least squares proce-
dure yields a consistent estimator for (β0, β1, β2). As is
clear through this simple example, the textbook equa-
tion (1.1) can be seen as a composite of the causal
(structural) equation (1.4) and the statistical depen-
dence relationship (1.5).
2. POINT ESTIMATE VERSUS BOUNDS:
A TREATMENT CHOICE PERSPECTIVE
The discussed paper also reviews the current debate
about the meaningfulness of the complier’s causal ef-
fect (Section 4.6). Imbens advocates the importance
and practical values of reporting the complier’s causal
effect for the reason that it is the only causal estimand
point-identified under the maintained assumptions. Im-
bens, at the same time, acknowledges that the popula-
tion average causal effect is a parameter of primary in-
terest in many contexts of causal inference, and he rec-
ommends to report also the bounds of the population
average causal effect. In my opinion, Imbens’ proposal
is quite sensible if the main task of the data analyst
is to make “scientific reporting” about the causal ef-
fects. The point-identified causal parameter for com-
pliers and the set-identified causal parameter for the
entire population reflect (partially) distinct aspects of
the data distribution, and, importantly, the best we can
learn from data under the maintained assumptions are
only those.
The objectives of causal studies are not only for “sci-
entific reporting,” but also for assisting “decision mak-
ing” of a policy maker. If the latter is a main task of
the data analyst, then my personal view is that neither
of the complier’s causal effect estimate nor the bounds
of the average causal effect should be the final out-
put that the decision maker would find most useful. To
make my argument more concrete, suppose that the de-
cision maker’s objective is to maximize the social wel-
fare defined by the sum of individual outcomes over
the target population. As in Chamberlain (2011), we
suppose that he/she solves the treatment choice prob-
lem based on a posterior belief for the social welfare,
that is, the decision maker is Bayesian. Since a com-
parison of the social welfare between the cases with
and without implementation of the treatment depends
only on the population average causal effect, the pos-
terior distribution of the average causal effect obtained
from her/his carefully specified prior input leads to the
decision maker’s optimal choice (see Chickering and
Pearl, 1997 and Imbens and Rubin, 1997) for Bayesian
estimation of the average causal effect). On the other
hand, point estimates and inferential statements for the
complier’s causal effect and the bounds for the popula-
tion causal effect do not directly guide formal decision-
making.
The argument I just gave crucially relies on the
Bayesian premise that the decision maker can fully
specify a prior for the potential outcomes distributions.
This may not always be the case depending on a con-
text. Given the absence of a universal consensus on
a “noninformative” prior, inability to specify a credi-
ble prior becomes a serious concern especially when
the causal effect of interest is not identified, since the
lack of identification makes the posterior sensitive to a
choice of prior no matter how large the sample size is.
One way to overcome this practical difficulty would be
to follow Manski’s (2000, 2005) frequentist approach
based on the minimax and minimax regret decision
principle, which relies only on the knowledge of the
bounds of the population average causal effect.
The Bayesian approach and Manski’s data-alone ap-
proach are each grounded in the two extreme schools
of statistics. This means that there should certainly
be a room for blending the aspects of these two ap-
proaches to complement their advantages and disad-
vantages. One compromising approach would be to
perform a minimax or minimax-regret decision anal-
ysis with multiple priors/posteriors, namely, the -
minimax or -minimax regret decision analysis (see,
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e.g., Berger, 1985, Chapter 4). For instance, in the cur-
rent context, we can consider constructing a set of pos-
teriors of average causal effects by combining a sin-
gle posterior for the identifiable parameters (causal ef-
fects for compliers, the mean of treatment outcome for
always-takers, the mean of control outcome for never-
takers) with a collection of priors of the nonidentified
parameters (the mean of control outcome for always-
takers and the mean of treatment outcome for never-
takers). The collection of priors for the nonidentified
parameters may represent the decision maker’s partial
or vague prior knowledge, or represent the degree of
robustness that the decision maker wants to maintain
in making the decision. Here, a single prior for the
identified parameters would make sense in a scenario
that the decision maker feels less anxious about a prior
mis-specification for the identifiable parameters since
he/she knows data will well update it. If the class of
priors for the nonidentified parameters is not as large
as the one that allows for arbitrary ones, the result-
ing posterior -minimax treatment choice rule will not
be as conservative as the Manski’s data-alone minimax
treatment choice rule based solely on the bounds. At
the same time, unlike the standard Bayesian analysis
with a single prior distribution, it can lead to a decision-
making with taking into account the posterior sensitiv-
ity concern with respect to a choice of a prior for the
nonidentified parameters.
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